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Emotions, Psychological Structure of
As is the case with many concepts in the social
sciences, the term `emotion,' used widely in everyday
language, constitutes a hypothetical construct, that is,
a conceptual and operational de®nition of an under-
lyingphenomenonthatconstitutestheobjectoftheory
and research. While laypersons use `emotion' inter-
changeably with terms such as aﬀect, feeling, sen-
timent, or mood, psychologists de®ne the construct as
a process of changes in diﬀerent components rather
than a homogeneous state. Furthermore, it is assumed
that the diﬀerentiation of the emotions (e.g., into fear,
anger, or joy) is based on speci®c con®gurations of
changes in the components.
1. Components
Starting with Greek philosophy, there has been an
uninterrupted tradition of postulating at least three
major reaction components of emotion: physiological
arousal, motor expression, and subjective feeling.
These three components are often referred to as the
`emotional response triad.'
1.1 Physiological Arousal
The widespread notion that emotions upset the body's
equilibrium state suggests that the presence of arousal
or activation is one of the major preconditions for
using the label `emotion.' References to physiological
changes such as temperature sensations, respiratory
and cardiovascular accelerations and decelerations,
trembling and muscle spasms, as well as feelings of
constriction in internal organs are frequently part of
emotion descriptions. The important role of neuro-
physiological changes in emotional episodes is due to
theemotion-elicitingeventdisturbingongoinghomeo-
static regulation and smooth behavioral coordination,
andthepreparationofappropriateadaptiveresponses
(e.g., producing the necessary energy for appropriate
actions such as ®ght or ¯ight).
1.2 Motor Expression
The changes in facial and vocal expression, as well as
in gestures and posture, during emotion episodes are
also considered to be central components of the
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1998) these expressions are rudiments of formerly
adaptive behaviors (e.g., clenching one's teeth as a
rudiment of a biting response). Whatever their origin,
mostscholarshaveexplainedemotionalexpressionsin
terms of their communicative functions, broadcasting
the reaction of an individual and its corresponding
behavior intentions to other members of the group.
1.3 Subjectie Feeling
The fact that individuals can verbally report a mul-
titude of qualitatively diﬀerent feelings, as encoded in
a rich emotion vocabulary, constitutes the most
important facet of emotional episodes for many
scholars in the ®eld of emotion. These internal
sensations, often considered as necessarily conscious
experiences, are often called `qualia,' irreducible
qualities of feeling that are unique to the speci®c
emotional experience of a particular individual. More
recently, it has been suggested that the feeling com-
ponent of emotion can be conceptualized as a re-
¯ection of all changes in components during an
emotion episode, that is, the results of event appraisal,
motivational change, and proprioceptive feedback
from motor expression and physiological reactions. It
is importanttodiﬀerentiallyde®netheconcepts in this
fashion as the tendency to use emotion (the process as
a whole) and feeling (one of its components) as
synonyms results in confusion (Scherer 2000a).
1.4 Behaior Preparation
It has been argued that the classic response triad needs
to be complemented by another componentÐ
behavior preparation or action tendencies (Frijda
1986, Scherer 1984). While both the physiological and
expressivecomponents implythepreparation ofadap-
tive action in a general, often unspeci®c way, the
notion of speci®c action tendencies being part of the
response syndrome suggests a more explicitly motiva-
tional function. Emotions change ongoing goal-
directed behavior and produce action tendencies that
are speci®cally adapted to dealing with the environ-
mental contingency that has elicited the emotional
response.
1.5 Cognitie Processes
In the wake of the cognitive revolution in the social
and behavioral sciences, there has been increasing
recognitionthatemotionsmayhaveverystrongeﬀects
on perceptual and cognitive processes such as at-
tention, thinking, memory, problem solving, judg-
ment, decision making, and the like (see contributions
in Dalgleish and Power 1999). Thus, the emotional
response syndrome also includes a cognitive com-
ponent. It can be further argued that the emotion
construct should not be restricted to the response
components but should also include the speci®c
characteristics of the processes that elicit and dif-
ferentiatetheemotions.Thus,proponentsofappraisal
theories of emotion suggest that emotional reactions
are determined by the subjective evaluation of events
withrespecttotheir signi®canceforthewell-beingand
goal attainment of individuals (see contributions in
Scherer et al. 2001). The recursiveness of the ap-
praisal±response sequence (e.g., the evaluation of an
event as dangerous may produce fear which in turn
may aﬀect the ensuing evaluation of subsequent
events) strengthens the suggestion to include cognitive
appraisal processes as a component of the emotion
construct.
While the notion that emotions are syndromes of
component changes is widely accepted, there is debate
as to the relative importance of these components,
particularly as to which ones should be considered as
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the occurrence
of emotion. The components are expected to interact,
that is, to in¯uence each other. Thus, one issue of
researchconcernsthepossibilitythatmotorexpression
may produce speci®c feelings or at least increase or
decrease the intensity of subjective experience (as
postulated by proprioceptive feedback theories; see
Scherer 2000a for further detail).
2. Process
While it is customary to talk of `emotional states,'
emotion researchers generallyemphasizethatemotion
is a process in time. Generally, research has shown
that diﬀerent emotions have diﬀerent time patterns
including diﬀerential duration and varying onset or
oﬀset patterns. What is seen as part of an emotion
episode partly depends on the speci®c de®nitions
proposed by a researcher. In what follows, a number
of sequential phases or stages of typical emotion
episodes are described. Emotions can be evoked by a
number of diﬀerent factors, including external events
or behaviors, internal neurophysiological changes, or
memory recall. All of these potential origins will be
subsumed under the term `stimulus event' (triggering
an emotion episode). Since external events seem to be
the most frequent elicitors, the description below is
biased toward such types of stimulus events (e.g., a
sudden noise that might represent an explosion in the
vicinity).
Salient stimulus events are immediately evaluated
by an automatic evaluation process on lower, sub-
cortical levels of the central nervous system (CNS),
focusing attention on the stimulus. This preliminary
evaluation may result in orientation and}or defense
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Stimulus events thus marked for requiring further,
more controlled or eﬀortful processing are subject to
being appraised by evaluation processes on higher
levels oftheCNS,inparticular thecortical association
areas and memory (Dalgleish and Power 1999, Leven-
thal and Scherer 1987). In this phase, the causation of
the event (i.e., the objects and individuals likely to be
responsible), the process involved, the consequences
to be expected, the implications for the well-being and
the immediate goals of the individual, and the ability
to modify the consequences or to adjust to them, are
evaluated (a process described in detail by appraisal
theories of emotion; see contributions in Scherer et al.
2001).
The appraisal process generally produces motiv-
ation towards an adaptive response to the event.
Depending on the importance of the consequences to
be expected, this urge may generate a primordial goal
for the speci®c moment in time (e.g., survival or self-
assertion), superseding all prior needs, desires, or
goals. Once the consequences of the event and the
individual'sresponsepotentialareevaluatedinatleast
a preliminary fashion, the current goal}plan hierarchy
needs to be restructured. This stage can be called
`goal}need priority setting.' Next, action alternatives
are examined with respect to the cost involved and the
likelihood of success. The result of this selection
produces more speci®c action tendencies or behavior
preparation (Frijda 1986), enabling the organism to
rapidly engage in a certain class of behaviors (e.g.,
mobilizing the necessary energy for ®ght or ¯ight). In
this phase, the internal monitoring of the event
appraisal and the physiological and expressive re-
actions (as re¯ected in subjective feeling, see above)
playa centralrole indetermining theneed for emotion
control or regulation, inhibiting execution of the
activated action tendencies. The next phase consists of
behavior execution, that is, the triggering of motor
commands that produce concrete overt behavior, in
terms of instrumental motor behavior and verbal or
nonverbal communicative acts. In many cases the
individual will, during or after the emotion episode,
probably talk about the emotional experiences with
others (emotional communication).
So far, thedescription hasfocused on thepartofthe
emotionprocessconsistingofanindividual'sreactions
toan event.Inmanycases thisreactionisembedded in
a social context (particularly when an interaction
partner has provoked the reaction) and is only the
beginning of an interactive process in which each
reaction of one of the protagonists is a stimulus event
that is likely to modify the emotion process. Examples
are the escalation of anger or the soothing of sadness
through the empathic response of another. This
process of interpersonal emotion regulation or escala-
tion has been well described in the context of marital
interactions (Gottman 1993). In social interaction
emotions, and particularly emotional expression, are
often `managed' in the pursuit of strategic goals such
as self-presentation, intimidation, adulation, and so
forth (Goﬀman 1959, Manstead 1991).
3. Diﬀerentiation
So far, the structure of emotion has been de®ned in
terms of the underlying theoretical construct, in
particular with respect to components and process.
However, the problem of structure also arises when
the diﬀerentiation of the emotions is addressed: How
many emotions are there and what are they? This
question is answered very diﬀerently depending on the
theoretical stance adopted (see contributions in
Ekman and Davidson 1994). Below, a number of
major theoretical positions and their views on this
issue are brie¯y described (see Scherer 2000b for
greater detail).
3.1 Dimensional Models
The ®rst explicit dimensional model was formulated
by Wundt (1905) who used both introspective and
experimental methods to study subjective feeling
experiences. He proposed that feelings varied by
their positions on three independent dimensions:
pleasantness±unpleasantness, rest±activation, and re-
laxation±attention. This model strongly in¯uenced
early emotion psychology. It has an intuitive appeal
since it has been shown that humans have a tendency
to perceive all kinds of meaning in terms of valence
(i.e., positive vs. negative) and activation (active±
passive; see Osgood et al. 1975). Following this
tradition, many dimensional theorists argue that the
diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently well described by one or
both of these central dimensions. Dimensional models
have been particularly successful in social psycho-
logicalandneurophysiologicalapproachestoemotion
(see Scherer 2000b).
3.2 Discrete Emotion Models
Theorists in this tradition postulate a limited set of
basic emotions such as fear, anger, joy, sadness, and
disgust, characterized by a number of fundamental
adaptive responses to prototypical events (e.g., fear}
¯ight in response to an attack by a powerful enemy,
disgust}avoidance in the case of spoiled food). Thus,
the structure of emotion diﬀerentiation is given by
prototypical,phylogeneticallyevolvedadaptationpat-
terns. Some models suggest that the diﬀerentiation
and the number of fundamental emotions is deter-
mined by evolved neural circuits (circuit models; e.g.,
Panksepp 1998) or by phylogenetically continuous
classes of motivation such as aggression or nurturance
(motivational models, e.g., Plutchik 1980). Based on
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existenceofasmallnumberofdiscrete,basicemotions
in the form of neuromotor programs. Tomkins'
suggestion has been extended by Ekman and Izard,
who worked towards obtaining empirical evidence for
theoreticallyderivedconsequencesofdiscreteemotion
theory, such as early ontogenetic onset of the discrete
emotion patterns, discrete patterning of prototypical
facial expressions, and universality of these patterns
(Ekman 1992, Izard 1991). Theorists in this tradition
have suggested that these basic emotions can be mixed
or blended, thus explaining the large variety of
emotion-descriptive verbal labels in many languages.
3.3 Meaning-oriented Models
Frequently,thesemantic ®elds oftermsinthe emotion
vocabulariesofdiﬀerentlanguagesareusedtodescribe
the structure of emotion, assuming that there is a
mapping between semantic and psychological struc-
tures and categories. For example, lexical models try
to de®ne basic emotions as prototypical linguistic
categories (e.g., a prototypical `anger' category cover-
ingtermssuchasirritation,rage, beingcross,etc.; e.g.,
Shaver et al. 1987) and to de®ne each category by
listing, as is the case in a dictionary, the semantic
prerequisites and implications for the use of the word
(e.g.,inthecaseofindignation,`beingdeniedwhatone
thinks one has a claim on'). Close to this view are
socialconstructivistmodelsclaimingthattheemotions
are constituted or constructed by socioculturally
determined behavior and value patterns, varying
greatly over cultures. For example, it is suggested that
certain emotions exist only in speci®c cultures or that
a particular emotion has disappeared because of
historic changes in cultural values and lifestyles. These
models all suggest that the structure of emotion
diﬀerentiation cannot be reduced to basic psycho-
biological patterns (i.e., a limited number of adaptive
behaviors) but needs to be modeled on the basis of
sociocultural meaning, often re¯ected in the semantic
structureoftheemotionvocabulary(seeScherer2000b
for more detail).
3.4 Adaptational Models
Theorists focusing on the way in which evolution may
have equipped organisms to respond automatically to
signi®cant events have developed what can be called
`biological preparedness' models. For example,
O > hman (1988) has developed a model that suggests
that humans have unconscious detection mechanisms
forstimulithatarepotentially harmful(suchassnakes
and spiders). The automatic detection of such threat
stimuli serves to eﬃciently prepare emergency re-
actions on the level of the autonomic nervous system
(ANS). LeDoux's (1996) work shows that the neural
architecture of the fear system (at least in rats) is
optimally suited for the production of such rapidly
and automatically elicited but relatively nondif-
ferentiated responses.
3.5 Componential Models
Componential emotion theorists postulate that
emotionsareelicitedbyacognitive(butnotnecessarily
conscious or controlled) appraisal of antecedent situa-
tions and events and that the patterning of the
reactions in the diﬀerent response domains (physi-
ology, expression, action tendencies, feeling) is pro-
duced by the outcome of this evaluation process.
According to this view, the structure of emotion is the
resultofthedimensionsorcriteriausedintheappraisal
processtodeterminethemeaningofthestimulusevent
to the individual and of the response patterns (facial
and vocal expression, physiological symptoms) gen-
erated by the appraisal results (see the chapters
authored or co-authored by Ellsworth, Frijda,
Lazarus, Roseman, Scherer, and Smith in Scherer et
al. 2001). Lazarus (1991) sees emotion structure as
determined by appraisals on a small number of
dimensions called `relational themes' (e.g., `loss of a
cherished person or thing' giving rise to sadness). In
contrast, the component process model proposed by
Scherer (1984; see also chapter in Scherer et al. 2001)
suggests that one can distinguish as many diﬀerent
emotional processes as there are diﬀerential patterns
of appraisal results. However, it is suggested that
there are modal emotion outcomes corresponding to
universal organism±environment interactions (e.g.,
`blocked goals') which tend to be labeled by short
emotion terms (e.g., anger) in most languages. The
otherappraisaltheoristsadoptintermediatepositions.
This review shows that the current psychological
models of emotion vary quite strongly in their postu-
latesregardingthestructureofemotionwithrespectto
focus on speci®c components, presumptions about the
nature of the process, and the explanations oﬀered for
the diﬀerentiation of individual emotions. A two-
dimensional coordinate system can be used to plot
these structural diﬀerences among psychological
theories of emotion. One dimension consists of the
diﬀerent components of the emotion syndrome, as
described above: cognitive processes, peripheral
physiological responses, motivational changes, motor
expression, and subjective feeling. The second dim-
ension consists of the diﬀerent stages of the emotion
process,asoutlinedabove.Table1showswhereinthis
space the models reviewed above can be located.
Table 1 illustrates the origin of some of the
diﬀerences in assumptions about the psychological
structure of emotion: The more a model is concerned
with the output end of the emotion process (e.g., the
selection of adaptive responses), the more it sees
structure as being determined by the type of action
tendency(e.g.,a¯ighttendencycharacterizingthefear
response). In contrast, the more a model focuses on
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Comparison of major emotion theories with respect to their focus on components and phases in the emotion process
The solid area, representing a particular type of model, is drawn across the intersections of components and phases that theorists in the respective
tradition focus on most. The horizontal lines projecting from the solid areas indicate that a particular model includes in its theorizing at least some
of the components/phases crossed by these lines.
the appraisal phases, that is, the input end of the
emotion process, the less constrained is the presumed
structure of emotion diﬀerentiation, allowing for a
multitude of potential outcomes of the appraisal
process. Obviously, it also matters which component
of emotion a speci®c model focuses on. Models
oriented toward the output end of the process tend to
focus on the motivational (action tendencies) and
motor expression components whereas those focusing
on the input side highlight the cognitive component as
being involved in structural diﬀerentiation. The table
also allows one to determine which theories are
committed to a psychobiological view (the models
focusing on the physiological and expressive com-
ponents, i.e., adaptational, motivational, circuit, and
discrete emotion models) in contrast to those that lean
more towards the phenomenological or sociocultural
aspects of emotion (the models focusing on the
subjective feeling component, i.e., dimensional, mean-
ing,andconstructivistmodels).Appraisalmodelstend
to span the complete range of components. In spite of
these diﬀerences, the claims of the diﬀerent models are
quite compatible once one allows for the fact that they
focus on diﬀerent components of emotion and dif-
ferent phases of the process.
4. Outlook
The explosive growth of emotion research in the last
quarter of the twentieth century has produced both
conceptual and methodological tools that promise to
revolutionize the study of emotion. Largely con®ned
to philosophical speculation based on verbal reports
of subjective experience for much of its history, and
hampered by terminological confusion, the study of
emotion is increasingly based on a consensus con-
cerning fundamental conceptual distinctions and
employs methods that complement the traditional
reliance on verbal report. In particular, the objective
assessment of facial and vocal expression as well as of
neurophysiological reactions allows a multicom-
ponent approach to measurement that is likely to do
greater justice to the complex structure of emotion
episodes. Another promising development is the rap-
prochement between psychological and neuroscience
approaches to emotion, with insights on the neural
architecture of the emotion system, obtained through
brain imagery, providing information on process
characteristics. Our understanding of emotion pro-
cesses has also been advanced by copious work on the
development of emotion (see Infancy and Childhood:
Emotional Deelopment) and on aﬀective disturbance.
Progress has been somewhat less marked with
respect to the social functions of emotion: While there
is much research on the in¯uence of mood on social
cognition, there have been only very few eﬀorts to
study empirically the role of emotion in social inter-
action.Phenomenalikeemotionalcontagion,aﬀective
in¯uence, anger escalation, or emotional climate in
groups constitute promising areas for future research
on the social context of emotion processes.
See also: Culture and Emotion; Emotion and Expres-
sion; Emotion: History of the Concept; Emotion,
Neural Basis of; Emotions, Evolution of; Emotions,
History of; Self-conscious Emotions, Psychology of
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1. Introduction
Inthis article, a brief socialhistory of the Western bias
against emotions will clear the air for their current
study. Works de®ning the beginnings of the `sociology
of emotions' are described; substantive topics addres-
sed by the ®eld are organized under a cybernetic
macro±micro framework that emphasizes its cont-
ribution to sociology in general.
The sociology of emotions is premised on several
recent observations that contradict popular preju-
dices. First, some constant emotional posture is
necessary for mental functioning. Second, rather than
depicting the asocial, idiosyncratic part of human
existence that escapes through the seams of social
organization, emotion is socially patterned and is a
vital part of the maintenance of social organization.
Third,ratherthanshapingthemere culturaldisplay of
biologically ®xed emotions, in most cases, social pro-
cesses are involved in their very constitution.
De®nitions of emotion typically include organized
mental states comprising cognitive appraisals, im-
pulses to action, and to varying degrees, feelings.
Hochschild(1983)likensemotionstosensesthatsignal
what is personally relevant about surrounding events.
Scheﬀhascautionedthattheattempttode®neemotion
is a rock on which many a ship has split. One diﬃ-
culty is that emotion labels are often ideological.
Contemporary American salaries for corporate exec-
utiveoﬃcersaveraging400timesmorethanthelowest
organizational worker can be viewed in terms of
`purely objective rewards for eﬀectiveness,' self-inte-
rest, or greed.
2. The Recent Shift in the Western Ealuation of
Emotion
Untiltheendofthetwentiethcentury,Westernsociety
paid scant attention to emotions except to warn
againstthemasasourceofbias.Thelastquarterofthe
century however, saw a signi®cant reversal from the
devaluation of emotion to recognition of its crucial
importance. Emotion, once seen as the enemy of
rationality is now viewed as the foundation for our
engagementin theworld. Studies ofbrain trauma now
identify certain emotional processes as necessary for
rational choice-making and social adaptation. Arti-
®cial intelligence research reveals the importance of
emotional predispositions in selecting what is relevant
toa particular lineof thoughtout ofan unmanageable
array of objective possibilities. Philosophers contend
that `emotion is what one sees the world in terms of.'
Thus, emotion sets the very agenda for thought.
3. The Discursie Origins of the Word Emotion
The practice of carving aﬀective experience into many
separate subtypes and grouping them together as the
same kind of psychic phenomena called `emotion,' is
relatively recent, and suspect to many scholars. The
word did not appear in the Oxford Dictionary until
1580, after terms like `self' and `consciousness' lost
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